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Welcome to the Social
- Microsoft tagline for the Zune digital music player
Sharing music among friends and family is not only an
important cultural tradition,1 but, from the content provider's point of

J.D. Candidate, University of California, Davis School of Law (King Hall), 2007.
1.
David F. Gallagher, For the Mix Tape, A Digital Upgrade and Notoriety, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at G5.

498

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9:3:497

view, it is also an increasingly effective form of marketing. 2 Recorded
music enjoys legal protection in the form of intellectual property,
specifically copyright law. 3 As a property right, copyright enables the
holder to control a wide range of uses 4 that do not fall into "fair use." 5
The legal uncertainty of sharing digital music among friends and
family 6 generally would not draw the attention of copyright holders,
but the widespread sharing of digital music either over networks or
through high capacity portable music players threatens the economic
7
viability of the music industry.
The use of digital restrictions to control downstream
distribution of music theoretically clears up the hazy line between
private use and piracy.8 Content providers, software developers and
technology suppliers may negotiate appropriate transfer limitations to
protect content providers' interests. The protection of copyright
through technological measures is commonly known as Digital Rights
Management, or simply DRM. Such protections have been employed
by content providers and technology companies. 9 In practice however,
managing copyright with DRM interferes with consumer interests in a
manner that undermines the perceived legitimacy of copyright law
that is necessary for voluntary compliance. 10
This article argues that it is possible to implement DRM
schemes without eroding the public's trust by offering consumers a
choice between technologically-restricted and unrestricted content.
Part I discusses how DRM have harmed voluntary compliance with
the law. Part II examines the biggest copyright governance issue
confronting peer-to-peer networks: casual piracy. Part III explains
how a bifurcated licensing scheme can allow content providers to
benefit from DRM without incurring its usual costs. Note that some
2.

Julia Angwin et al., Record Labels Turn Piracy Into Marketing Opportunity,

WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2006, at B1.

3.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
4.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
5.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
6.
See infra Part II.A.
7.
This article does not address massive copyright infringement (high-volume
bootlegging or use of Darknets) because such criminal activity is, in the author's opinion,
better enforced by federal authorities. Darknets are private networks of trusted users,
often associated with the sharing of copyrighted material. Material initially distributed
through Darknets often winds up on open file sharing networks. See generally J.D. LASICA,
DARKNET: HOLLYWOOD'S WAR AGAINST THE DIGITAL GENERATION (2005). This article is
directed at sharing songs digitally with personal contacts. This issue is discussed more
fully infra in Part II.

8.

See infra Part I.

9.
10.

See id.
See infra Part I.D.
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music distributors and labels have begun to adopt this licensing
structure. 1
I. PREVIOUS DRM IMPLEMENTATIONS
The music industry's previous attempts to use DRM have not
been effective. 12 Instead, DRM has exposed the industry to bad
publicity and lost the trust of some consumers. 13
A. The Microsoft Zune
In the fall of 2006, Microsoft unveiled its portable digital music
device, the Zune. 14 Like the industry-dominating Apple iPod, 15 the
Zune features the ability to play libraries of music, but, in addition,
the Zune allows users to transmit songs wirelessly to other Zune
owners.1 6 To protect against wholesale copying, Microsoft employs a
DRM scheme that causes transferred songs to "expire" after either
three plays or three days, whichever comes first. 7 Despite innovative
advertising of Zune, critics were unimpressed18 and its initial sales
were unremarkable. 19 For example, New York Times technology
writer David Pogue described the Zune as "a killer idea diluted by a
20
ham-handed execution."

11.
Music label EMI has announced that it will offer music both with and without
DRM, available on Apple iTunes. EMI's DRM-free singles will cost more than the DRM
counterpart. Full albums will be sold without DRM. Press Relase, EMI, EMI Music
Launches DRM-free Superior Sound Quality Downloads Across its Entire Digital Repertoire
(Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.emigroup.com/Press/2007/press18.htm.
12.
See infra Part I.A, I.B.
13.
See infra Part I.C.
14.
Press Release, Microsoft, Microsoft Zune Delivers Connected Music and
Entertainment Experience (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://www.microsoft.coml
presspass/press/2006/sepO6/09-14ZuneUnveilingPR.mspx.
15.
Jenna Wolf, Hear Today, Gone Tomorrow, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 9, 2006, at
Edge, 7 ('Apple has sold more than 42 million iPods since they went on sale in 2001,
making it the most popular portable MP3 player.").
16.
Press Release, Microsoft, supra note 14.
17.
Id.
18.
See posting of Dwight Silverman to Houston Chronicle Tech Blog,
http:/blogs.chron.com/techblog/archives/2006/11/here-a-zune-the_1.html (Nov. 12, 2006,
09:59 EST) (rounding up reviews of the Zune and describing critical response as "[m]ixed,
and shall we say, not altogetherkind").
19.
See Ina Fried, Study: Zune Fails to Crack Top 10 in Sales, CNET NEWS.COM,
Jan. 4, 2006, http://news.com.com/Study+Zune+fails+to+crack+top+10+in+sales/21001041_3-6147422.html.
20.
David Pogue, BrilliantIdeas That Found a Welcome, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006,
at C1.

500

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW

[Vol. 9:3:497

B. The Sony BMG Rootkit
Microsoft should have expected bad press from overly
restrictive DRM, especially because, just one year earlier, music label
Sony BMG experienced even worse press regarding copy protection
found on some of its compact discs. In 2005, Sony BMG released
several records encrypted with computer code that prevented
consumers from making excessive copies of purchased records. 21 The
DRM raised little if any notice until computer analyst Mark
Russinovich noted oddities in his computer's functioning. 22 Upon
some investigation, he discovered that one of his recently purchased
23
compact discs "hid" a computer program onto his operating system.
Van Zant's album "Get Right with the Man" 24 had secretly planted a
"rootkit" onto his computer. 25 A rootkit is a "set of tools designed to
conceal running processes." 26 He wrote a blog entry describing how he
discovered the rootkit, and within hours hundreds of viewers had
27
visited his site.
Before long, the mainstream media caught wind of the story,
bringing the words "DRM" and "rootkit" into pop culture. 28 The
assumption was that this was a terrible public relations fiasco that

21.
Dan Mitchell, The Rootkit of All Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at C5;
Wikipedia.org, 2005 Sony BMG CD Copy Protection Scandal, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikiI2005_Sony_..BMG_ CDlcopy-protectionscandal (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
22.
Posting of Mark Russinovich to Mark's Blog, http://blogs.technet.com/
markrussinovichlarchive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gonetoo-far.aspx (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 EST).
23.
Id.
24.

VAN ZANT, GET RIGHT WITH THE MAN (Sony Records 2005).

25.
Russinovich, supra note 22.
26.
Wikipedia.org, Rootkit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit (last visited Feb.
26, 2007). Rootkits are most often associated with hackers because they run without a
user's knowledge. Id. For DRM purposes, the reason for concealing the process is to prevent
the user from shutting down the program that prevents copying. Id. Russinovich showed
that by merely prefixing "$sys$" to a program file name, the program could be run without
the user's knowledge. Russinovich, supranote 22.
27.
See Russinovich, supra note 22. Digg.com and Slashdot.org had links to
Russinovich's blog entry the same day it was posted. See posting of ScuttleMonkey to
Slashdot, http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/10/31/2016223 (Oct. 31, 2005, 19:04);
posting of Burnsey to Digg, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far,
http://www.digg.com/security/Sony,_RootkitsandDigital Rights ManagementGoneToo_
Far (Oct. 31, 2005). The tech-savvy audiences of Digg and Slashdot were enraged: calls to
boycott Sony and threats of class-action lawsuits were not uncommon. See, e.g., posting of
Indytx (825419) to Slashdot, http://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=166915&threshold=
1&commentsort=0&mode-thread&cid=13922517 (Nov. 1, 2005, 08:45).
28.
See Mitchell, supra note 21.
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would cost Sony and its artists dearly. 29 According to market tracker
Nielsen SoundScan, however, the discs with DRM suffered little if any
decline when "compared with other medium selling titles at similar
points in their release cycles."3 0 Moreover, sales of the Van Zant
album, the album most commonly associated with the rootkit, actually
31
increased.
C. Effects on Marketing and Promotion
If DRM does not necessarily result in lower sales, why should
the music industry be concerned with the issue? For artists, the
problem with DRM is that it limits the use of their music. As Damian
Kulash, singer in the band OK Go, describes the problem: "A record
that you can't transfer to your iPod is a record you're less likely to
listen to, less likely to get obsessed with and less likely to tell your
friends about." 32 OK Go's label, EMI, wanted to test DRM software on
the band's album because its audience is comprised of primarily
college students. 33 College students are more likely to trade rather
than buy albums, 34 so DRM-protected albums presumably would
result in higher sales. Kulash, however, sees limited trading as
35
necessary to gain exposure and buzz, and thus disapproves of DRM.
Other bands, recognizing the danger of limiting use of their music,
have told their fans how to get around DRM protection in order to load

29.
Martin Reynolds & Mike McGuire, Sony BMG DRM a Public-Relations and
Technology Failure,Gartner Research, Nov. 18, 2005, availableat http://www.gartner.coml
resources/136300/13633 1/sony bmg-drm.a-publicrelatio_13633 1.pdf.
30.
John Borland, Sony Sailing Past Rootkit Controversy, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov.
21,
2005,
http://news.com.com/Sony+sailing+past+rootkit+controversy/2100-1027_35965243.html (noting that this was true up until the date of publication, at least).
31.
Id. Cf. Angela Pacienza, Copy-Protected CDs Turning Music Fans Off Record
Buying: Retailers, CANADA.COM, Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.canada.com/national/
("It's
nationalpost/news/story.html?id=9682a973-fOe4-4610-819f-f96bf087ec43&p=1
becoming a regular occurrence in CD shops across the country: an irate customer comes in
complaining the CD they bought won't play on their computer, and worse yet, they can't
transfer the tunes to their iPod.").
32.
Damian Kulash Jr., Buy, Play, Trade, Repeat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at A27.
33.
Id. (noting that college students usually have access to high-bandwidth
connections that facilitate digital music sharing).
Id.
34.
35.
Id.
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songs on iPods. 36 While Kulash may have a precise opinion on DRM,
37
however, most artists do not even know what DRM means.
D. Interference with Consumer Interests
When consumers purchase music, there is an expectation that
the purchase entitles the consumer to a set of legal rights.3 8 Property
rights have significant rhetorical power in American political
discourse; a lack of respect for property rights leads to distrust of the
legal apparatus, which in turn reduces voluntary compliance with the
law. 39 If there is a lesson to be learned from the Sony BMG rootkit
incident, "it should be that people want their demands for respect and
autonomy to be taken more seriously." 40 This is a challenge, because
DRM should stop non-fair use copyright infringement and
simultaneously grant enough room for legitimate users to use the
content without undue hindrances. It is unclear whether such a
balance is even possible, however, with the uniform application of
41
DRM.
II. CASUAL PIRACY OR PRIVATE SHARING
Some content providers view DRM as necessary to protect the
future viability of the music industry. 42 The Sony BMG rootkit
incident did not change the attitude of Recording Industry Association
36.
Mikael Hoffman, Musicians Tell Computer Users How to Beat System,
TECHSPOT.coM, http://www.techspot.com/news/18963-musicians-tell-computer-users-howto-beat-system.html (Oct. 5, 2005 10:40 EST).
37.
Tom Zeller Jr., The Ghost in the CD; Sony Stirs A Debate Over Software Used to
Guard Content, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at C1 ('Look, what we do is write music; we
make music,' said Donnie Van Zant, who like most artists had no idea what sort of security
features, if any, his label would place on the album. 'I really don't even know what D.R.M.
means, to be honest with you."').
38.
For example, pursuant to copyright law's "first sale" doctrine, "the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made . . .is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."
17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
39.

ToM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 22 (1990).

40.
John Borland, Who Has the Right to Control Your PC?, CNET NEWS.cOM, Nov.
21, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Who+has+the+right+to+control+your+PC/2100-1029_35961609.html (quoting Julie Cohen, Georgetown University Law Professor).
41.
Zeller, supra note 37 ("It's abundantly clear by now that no D.R.M. system can
stop serious pirates,' wrote Edward W. Felten, a professor of computer science and public
policy at Princeton University, on his blog, Freedom-To-Tinker.com. 'A D.R.M. system that
stops serious pirates, and simultaneously gives broad leeway to ordinary users, is even
harder to imagine."').
42.
Cary Sherman, RIAA President, Online Press Conference (Nov. 18, 2005),
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/111805.asp.
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of America ("RIAA") President Cary Sherman. 43 He expressed no
hesitation about the implementation of DRM in music recordings. 44
Compared with other copyright-dependent industries, he said that the
music industry's DRM schemes were not overly restrictive. 45 He
recognized that the next major legal issue to face the industry would
be from private sharing-what many call "casual piracy."46
In an August 2005 presentation to the RIAA, CEO Mitch
Bainwol displayed a slide saying: "Key point: Burning and ripping are
becoming a greater threat than [Peer-to-Peer networks]." 47 Even with
legal victories against peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing sites, 48
consumers can still use legitimate means to share music
illegitimately. For example, twenty-eight percent of Internet users
have used email or instant messaging to send or receive media files. 49
Growth of the digital music marketplace will mean a corresponding
increase in such sharing.
A. Legal Uncertainty
The legal status of locally sharing legitimately purchased
music is unclear. 50 There is a law that provides immunity for non-

43.
Id. The RIAA is a trade group representing major record labels. See generally
RIAA.com, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/l 11805.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
44.
Id. ("There is nothing unusual about technology being used to protect
intellectual property. You can't simply make an extra copy of a Microsoft operating system,
or virtually any other commercially-released software program for that matter. Same with
videogames. Movies, too, are protected. Why should CDs be any different?").
45.
Id. ("How many burns are you allowed of a movie? None. How many of a
videogame? None. You get the idea. Even the CDs with content protection allow consumers
to burn 3 copies or so for personal use. The idea is not to inhibit personal use, but to allow
personal use but discourage (not prevent, you can never prevent) copying well beyond
personal use.").
46.
Id.; see also Zeller, supra note 37 ("After years of battling users of free peer-topeer file-sharing networks (and the software companies that support them), the recording
industry now identifies 'casual piracy'-the simple copying and sharing of CD's with
friends-as the biggest threat to its bottom line.").
47.
Id.
48.
See generally MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
49.
PEW Internet & American Life Project, Music and Video Downloading Moves
Beyond P2P (Mar. 2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/report display.asp?r=153.
50.
Compare Electronic Frontier Foundation, Prelude to a Fake Complaint,
http://www.eff.org/IP/AppleComplaint.txt (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (stating that "all the
major record labels still believe that private sharing of songs from your CDs with friends is
copyright infringement") with FAQ, RIAA Website, http://www.riaa.com/newsl
newsletter/062503 b.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (responding to the question of whether
consumers have the right to make copies from their own CDs: "It depends on the
circumstances. Certainly, consumers may be able to make a limited number of copies for
their own personal use.").
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52
commercial copying of music, 51 but it does not apply to digital music.
Given the fact that there is no statute specifically governing
noncommercial copying of MP3s, it could constitute fair use, which is
an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.5 3 However, in 2005,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a file sharer's use of a
P2P network to share thirty songs constituted fair use.54 The logic
behind such a holding was based upon the principle that copyright
holders should be able to broadly control downstream duplications of
their copyrighted material. 55 The bottom line is that the law favors
the copyright holder with respect to sharing.
Arguments that "sharing" benefits the music industry in the
form of higher profits rest on the assumption that copyright is a
liability rule, where infringement triggers a penalty. 56 Given that
copyright is generally regarded as a property right,57 these arguments
have been afforded little weight in court.5 8 Non-fair use of copyrighted
works requires ex ante negotiation, and the copyright holder can deny
use at her sole discretion.

B. Interactionof Legal and Digital Control of Copyright

What should the music industry do to address casual piracy?
Despite technical legal uncertainty, the law generally favors the
copyright holder. 59 The real issue for the industry is how to use social

51.
See The Home Audio Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (creating immunity
from direct infringement "on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or
medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings."). Giving a
friend a record to rip onto MP3 or sharing an MP3 should be mere non-commercial use and
therefore immune.
52.
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the
district court ruling that the Home Audio Recording Act did not apply to MP3s).
53.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
54.
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
55.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 472 JSR, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13293 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000). MP3.com allowed subscribers to access music over
the Internet. Id. at *2. Subscribers could only listen to legitimately purchased albums. Id.
Subscribers proved ownership of albums with a verification service. Id. The plaintiffs won
on the theory that "defendant [was] re-playing for the subscribers converted versions of the
recordings it [had] copied, without authorization, from plaintiffs' copyrighted CDs." Id. at
*3.

56.
See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
57.
UMG Recordings, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13293, at *11 ("Copyright, however, is
not designed to afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect the
copyrightholders' property interests.")
58.
See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
59.
See supra Part II.A.
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norms and technological restrictions to protect its interests. People
voluntarily comply with laws to the extent they are perceived as fair. 60
Technological restrictions have the inevitable side effect of interfering
with legitimate uses of music, which in turn triggers a perception of
unfairness and decreases voluntary compliance. Arguments to wholly
abandon such restrictions are unpersuasive because they completely
ignore the interests of copyright holders.
III. BIFURCATED LICENSING
The solution for sharing should not be addressed at the
downstream level, but rather at the initial sale of the music. The
purchase of music, like any other copyrighted work, is really about the
sale of a license. The purchaser of a compact disc is not granted
unlimited rights to use the contents as he pleases, as full copyright
ownership is not transferred to the purchaser. 61 As such, the extent of
the purchaser's rights should be reflected in the price. An album with
technological restrictions, therefore, would cost less than an
unrestricted album. The practical consequence of such a policy is that
prices for unrestricted media would rise, the prices for restricted
media would decrease, or some combination of the two would happen.
The increased cost absorbs any incidental private copying, however,
which addresses the concern of casual piracy.
Licensing both
restricted and unrestricted versions of music can be termed
"bifurcated licensing."
A. Implementation

Bifurcated licensing is not intended to act as a form of price
discrimination that distinguishes buyers based on their ability to pay
(or the utility gained from their purchase). 62 Instead, it is a marketbased mechanism whereby purchasers can choose the extent of
copyright laws applicable to their specific purchase. An ordinary user
can opt for technologically restricted content, which makes sense for
the user who plans to play the music in a limited fashion, such as on
only one computer and one associated MP3 player. The user's limited

60.
TYLER, supra note 39, at 22.
61.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (noting the exclusivity of copyright ownership). The
purchaser cannot make unlimited copies or widely distribute the work, but he could do so if
he owned the copyright. See id. Note that purchasers can dispose of purchased copyrighted
material through the First Sale Doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
62.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
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use could be controlled by content providers in the digital restriction
scheme.
The technologically sophisticated user, on the other hand, can
opt for more expensive unrestricted content. 6 3 Such users often have
several computers and multiple devices with which to play music.
Content providers can treat such purchases like the sale of
unrestricted music today, but exercise leniency with respect to private
sharing.
Copyright holders can enjoy the marketing benefits of
sharing with bifurcated licensing. While some unauthorized copying
will occur, these losses can be offset with the higher cost associated
with unrestricted music.
B. Lessons from the DVD
To see how a bifurcated licensing scheme could help when it
comes to the distribution of digital media, consider the case of DVDs
encrypted with the DRM known as Content Scramble System, or
CSS. 64 Copyright holders can enforce their encryption efforts through
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).6 5 CSS led to litigation
involving individuals who posted the computer code to break open
CSS.66 Once an encryption mechanism is broken and there is a need
to break that encryption, there is no effective legal remedy for the
content provider. 67 With CSS, there was a need for users of the
computer operating system Linux to circumvent encryption because
they could not view legally purchased DVDs on their computers. 68 The
movie industry recognized the danger of broken encyrption, because it
would not only allow Linux users to view DVDs but also allow other
users to access DVD content on any computer system. 69 What started
out as a technical necessity evolved into a mechanism to allow a broad
array of unauthorized uses. The music industry should learn from the
experience of the movie industry and create a digital format that is

63.
As a viable alternative, the unrestricted version could apply a license that
permits broad reproduction and distribution. A Creative Commons license could allow for
greater exposure for up-and-coming bands. See generally Creative Commons,
http://creativecommons.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
64.
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436-37 (2d Cir. 2001).
65.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Circumvention of Copyright Protection
Systems, 17 U.S.C § 1201 (2000); see also id. §§ 1203, 1204.
66.
Corley, 273 F.3d at 435.
67.
Although Corley lost his case, the code to decrypt DVDs (deCSS) is widely
available via Google or any major search engine. See Google Search for "DECSS,"
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=decss (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
68.
Corley, 273 F.3d at 437.
69.
Id. at 438.
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actually user friendly, which would help to avert litigation against
consumers.
A bifurcated licensing scheme can help to reduce litigation
because allowing consumers to choose between unrestricted and
restricted content destroys the need for illegal decryption in the first
place. A person would have no motivation to either break the
encryption or encourage others to break the encryption when the far
simpler way to get an unrestricted copy is to simply spend a few extra
bucks. Preventing consumers from decrypting and disseminating
decryption code in the end will only protect the integrity of the
encryption.
The choice offered in a bifurcated licensing scheme allows the
ordinary consumer (who purchases cheaper, restricted content) to play
songs in accordance with protection schemes that have been approved
by the content providers themselves.
Technologically demanding
consumers, on the other hand, can purchase unrestricted content for a
premium. This defeats the efforts of hackers who seek to break copy
protection schemes. If consumers can opt for an unrestricted version
of an album, there is no sympathy for the cheapskate who wishes to
break restrictions.
C. Common Objections
The most salient concern regarding the sale of unrestricted
music is backflow: what stops the unrestricted content from being
widely distributed among non-purchasers?
This concern fails to
acknowledge that the vast majority of digital music is already
unrestricted. 70 Any approach to address backflow must be both
practical and feasible. Bifurcated licensing allows content providers to
recoup the costs of inevitable sharing and copying from the higher
price tag associate with unrestricted music, while at the same time
dictating the terms of sharing and copying for the majority of users.
This licensing scheme gives control back to the copyright holders while
being realistic about perfect enforcement. Furthermore, the scheme
empowers consumers by giving them a choice, which should lead to
increased voluntary compliance because of the perceived fairness of
the market.
One down side to a bifurcated licensing scheme is that it would
break the uniform pricing of music. This creates the problem that

70.
Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.comfhotnewsl
thoughtsonmusic (Apple research found that 97% of the music loaded onto Apple digital
music players is unrestricted).
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people might misperceive higher priced music as better.7 1 There are,
however, existing mechanisms to correct for such misperceptions.
Music critics provide opinions as to what music the (presumably
knowledgeable or at least reputable) critic deems noteworthy.
Furthermore, this enhances the importance and prestige of industrysponsored award shows because such awards provide powerful
signaling cues to what music is "good." The need to determine what
music to purchase further strengthens the value of online discussion
sites as consumers seek the opinions of like-minded peers. In all,
these activities will more deeply engage music listeners and promote
the long-term stability of the music industry.
IV. CONCLUSION

Offering both restricted and unrestricted content at
appropriate prices is imperative for the music industry. There are
already trends moving in this direction. 72 The music industry should
embrace bifurcated licensing and implement the pricing scheme on its
own terms. This scheme preserves the primacy of the copyright
holder. Waiting too long to recognize the importance of offering
consumers a choice could result in a cultural shift detrimental to the
interests of copyright holders, as seen with video sharing sites. 73
Offering a choice benefits both the industry and the consumer.
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shortcuts that people use to make judgments with imperfect information. Id. These mental
shortcuts have the side effect of creating biases, such as perception that more expensive
products are superior to cheaper ones. Id.
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See, e.g., eMusic, www.emusic.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (offering
unrestricted MP3s for a lower price than Apple iTunes).
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The term "tolerated use" was coined by Professor Tim Wu when describing the
legal landscape of video sharing site YouTube.com. See Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really Have
Legal Problems?, SLATE.COM., Oct. 26, 2006, http://slate.com/id/2152264 ("[M]uch of the
copyrighted material on YouTube is in a legal category that is new to our age. It's not 'fair
use,' the famous right to use works despite technical infringement, for reasons of public
policy. Instead, it's in the growing category of 'tolerated use'-use that is technically illegal,
but tolerated by the owner because he wants the publicity.").

